Large Language Models (LLMs) have redefined complex task automation with exceptional generalization capabilities. Despite these advancements, state-of-the-art methods rely on single-strategy prompting, missing the synergy of diverse reasoning approaches. No single strategy excels universally, highlighting the need for frameworks that fuse strategies to maximize performance and ensure robustness. We introduce the Select, Mix, and ReinvenT (SMaRT) framework, an innovative strategy fusion approach designed to overcome this constraint by creating balanced and efficient solutions through the seamless integration of diverse reasoning strategies. Unlike existing methods, which employ LLMs merely as evaluators, SMaRT uses them as intelligent integrators, unlocking the "best of all worlds" across tasks. Extensive empirical evaluations across benchmarks in reasoning, planning, and sequential decision-making highlight the robustness and adaptability of SMaRT. The framework consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in solution quality, constraint adherence, and performance metrics. This work redefines LLM-driven decision-making by pioneering a new paradigm in cross-strategy calibration, unlocking superior outcomes for reasoning systems and advancing the boundaries of self-refining methodologies.

Computing a good strategy in a large extensive form game often demands an extraordinary amount of computer memory, necessitating the use of abstraction to reduce the game size. Typically, strategies from abstract games perform better in the real game as the granularity of abstraction is increased. This paper investigates two techniques for stitching a base strategy in a coarse abstraction of the full game tree, to expert strategies in fine abstractions of smaller subtrees. We provide a general framework for creating static experts, an approach that generalizes some previous strategy stitching efforts. In addition, we show that static experts can create strong agents for both 2-player and 3-player Leduc and Limit Texas Hold'em poker, and that a specific class of static experts can be preferred among a number of alternatives. Furthermore, we describe a poker agent that used static experts and won the 3-player events of the 2010 Annual Computer Poker Competition.

Unlike perfect-information games, imperfect-information games cannot be decomposed into subgames that are solved independently. Thus more computationally intensive equilibrium-finding techniques are used, and abstraction---in which a smaller version of the game is generated and solved---is essential. Endgame solving is the process of computing a (presumably) better strategy for just an endgame than what can be computationally afforded for the full game. Endgame solving has many benefits, such as being able to 1) solve the endgame in a finer information abstraction than what is computationally feasible for the full game, and 2) incorporate into the endgame actions that an opponent took that were not included in the action abstraction used to solve the full game. We introduce an endgame solving technique that outperforms prior methods both in theory and practice. We also show how to adapt it, and past endgame-solving techniques, to respond to opponent actions that are outside the original action abstraction; this significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art approach, action translation. Finally, we show that endgame solving can be repeated as the game progresses down the tree, leading to significantly lower exploitability. All of the techniques are evaluated in terms of exploitability; to our knowledge, this is the first time that exploitability of endgame-solving techniques has been measured in large imperfect-information games.

We present a novel extension of normal form games that we call biased games. In these games, a player's utility is influenced by the distance between his mixed strategy and a given base strategy. We argue that biased games capture important aspects of the interaction between software agents. Our main result is that biased games satisfying certain mild conditions always admit an equilibrium. We also tackle the computation of equilibria in biased games.

Computing a good strategy in a large extensive form game often demands an extraordinary amount of computer memory, necessitating the use of abstraction to reduce the game size. Typically, strategies from abstract games perform better in the real game as the granularity of abstraction is increased. This paper investigates two techniques for stitching a base strategy in a coarse abstraction of the full game tree, to expert strategies in fine abstractions of smaller subtrees. We provide a general framework for creating static experts, an approach that generalizes some previous strategy stitching efforts. In addition, we show that static experts can create strong agents for both 2-player and 3-player Leduc and Limit Texas Hold'em poker, and that a specific class of static experts can be preferred among a number of alternatives. Furthermore, we describe a poker agent that used static experts and won the 3-player events of the 2010 Annual Computer Poker Competition.

Extensive games are often used to model the interactions of multiple agents within an environment. Much recent work has focused on increasing the size of an extensive game that can be feasibly solved. Despite these improvements, many interesting games are still too large for such techniques. A common approach for computing strategies in these large games is to first employ an abstraction technique to reduce the original game to an abstract game that is of a manageable size. This abstract game is then solved and the resulting strategy is used in the original game. Most top programs in recent AAAI Computer Poker Competitions use this approach. The trend in this competition has been that strategies found in larger abstract games tend to beat strategies found in smaller abstract games. These larger abstract games have more expressive strategy spaces and therefore contain better strategies. In this paper we present a new method for computing strategies in large games. This method allows us to compute more expressive strategies without increasing the size of abstract games that we are required to solve. We demonstrate the power of the approach experimentally in both small and large games, while also providing a theoretical justification for the resulting improvement.